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HE SECOND World War is often regarded as a watershed in world 
history. Observers have pointed to a number of changes in the global 
system that occurred after its conclusion: the emergence of bipolar 
system structure, along with new contenders for international leadership; the 
invention (and subsequent proliferation) of weapons of extreme power; and 
the explosion of new nation-states that has created a truly global system. But 
have these changes been accompanied by changes in behavior between 
nation states? This paper will investigate one aspect of interstate behavior- 
military conflict involving the major powers-and ascertain whether the time 
period 1946-1976 was marked by a sharp change in the amount of this con- 
flict, as compared to the period 1816-1945. 
WHY CHANGE MIGHT BE EXPECTED 
Each of the three changes noted above has led to assertions about the 
amount of conflict in the post-World War II era. Although there is general 
agreement on the nature of these changes, scholars and practitioners have 
differed in their conclusions as to the strength and direction of their associa- 
tion with the amount of conflict. Let us briefly consider the three sets of 
assertions about change and conflict under the headings of system polarity, 
the political utility of force, and the growth in the size of the interstate 
system. 
Polarity 
The first set of assertions begins with a consideration of the polarity of the 
interstate system in the post-World War II era. Most observers start from the 
premise that this time period, unlike the century-and-a-half preceding it, has 
been bipolar, at least until the late 1960s (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Waltz, 
1967; Rosecrance, 1966; but see Bueno de Mesquita, 1975). This dramatic 
change in system structure is thought to lead to an equally dramatic change 
in the amount of conflict. Since my concern here is not to test the polarity 
argument per se, I will bypass most of the disagreements in this literature' 
and merely indicate the differences in predictions of expected amount of con- 
flict in a bipolar system. All would agree that the more bipolar a system is, 
NOTE: The data used in this paper were kindly made available to me by the Correlates of War Project 
at the University of Michigan under the direction ofJ. David Singer and Melvin Small. I would 
also like to acknowledge the aid of Patty Renfrow in conducting the analyses. Responsibility for all 
errors is mine. 
'For example, is polarity (a) a function of the bonding patterns of nations; (b) a function of the distribu- 
tion of power across nations; or (c) a function of both? The system structure "debate" has its 
origins in arguments about whether a balance of power system existed in Europe and whether it 
preserved peace and/or stability. 
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the easier it is to tell "friend" from "foe" and make calculations as to how 
nation states will line up in any confrontation. The disagreement concerns 
whether this high level of certainty (as compared to a multipolar system) is 
conducive to peace. Bipolarity advocates believe that wars are more likely to 
occur through miscalculation and that miscalculation is more probable under 
low levels of certainty (i.e., with a multipolar system). Multipolarity advo- 
cates, on the other hand, believe that wars are more likely to occur through 
deliberate, calculated choice. They argue that the clarity of a bipolar system 
structure leads to high levels of certainty by decision-makers. This in turn 
means that a cost-benefit calculation favorable toward war is more likely to 
occur with a bipolar system. Under conditions of uncertainty, as would be 
present with multipolarity, decision-makers are more likely to be cautious 
and restrain themselves from war. 
The Political Utility of Military Force 
The second set of assertions concerns the political utility of military force 
in the post-World War II era. For reasons discussed below, some observers 
believe that the utility has decreased, and therefore, since governments are 
not completely irrational, the use of force is (and should be) on the wane. 
Other observers are more skeptical and believe that the utility of force has not 
been reduced; hence, its use should not have decreased (Halle, 1973, is 
optimistic; Art, 1980, is not). The arguments on this subject will be 
presented from the point of view of those who believe that military conflict is 
(and will) occur less frequently. 
The first element in these arguments is that the use of military force is 
increasingly regarded as being undesirable, in fact, more and more people see 
it as illegal. Obviously, there is no enforceable code of conduct for govern- 
ments, but to the extent that "self-help" (i.e., the resort by government to 
use of force) is seen as an unacceptable doctrine, one would expect to see it 
used less frequently. Lending support to the first part of this argument is a 
recent study examining over 200 legal treatises from 1815 to 1974 (Kegley, 
Raymond, and Choi, 1979). The results indicate that references to war 
shifted from assertions that it was a permissible action toward the position 
that it was not a legal act.2 
The second element in arguments about the political utility of force is 
based on the increased potential cost of using force. In particular, it is noted 
that the outbreak of conflict poses the prospect of escalation to a massive 
thermonuclear exchange, with attendant massive destruction, if not annihila- 
tion, of one or more nation states.3 Given these potentially high costs, 
2However, it is noted that the relationship between viewing war as an illegal act in legal treatises and 
actual nation state behavior, though negative (i.e., the more illegal it is regarded, the less the 
amount of war in the international system), is a weak one. 
3Even for those who foresee a dramatic difference between victory and defeat in a thermonuclear 
exchange (for example, Gray and Payne, 1980) use a figure of 20 million casualties for the United 
States, and that is with what they regard as an "intelligent U.S. offensive strategy wedded to 
homeland defenses." This figure is roughly 33 percent higher than the battle deaths suffered by all 
belligerents in World War II and about 100 percent higher than the battle deaths suffered by all 
belligerents in World War I (Singer and Small, 1972: 66-67). 
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governments will be reluctant to engage in the use of military force them- 
selves and to restrain the use of force by other governments. The latter 
follows since the externalities of any conflict between nation states may 
involve costs to uninvolved governments. 
The third element in the argument about the declining utility of force 
makes reference to the rise of interdependence between nation states 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977). Parts of the rising-interdependence rationale 
overlap with the previously stated arguments, but it also has some unique 
aspects. In particular, it is argued that as interdependence increases between 
nation states, a variety of mutually profitable relationships will be created 
and/or expanded between them. Use of force between nations will rupture 
these relationships. Since, under conditions of interdependence, military 
security no longer occupies the unquestioned primary position in govern- 
mental goal hierarchies, the breaking of these relationships will be viewed as 
very costly. These increasing costs also mean that military force cannot be 
used as an instrument of linkage to other issue areas. This further educes the 
utility of force. 
The Increase in Nation States 
The final set of assertions connecting a characteristic of the post-World 
War II era with a change in amount of conflict is based on the observation 
that there are many more nation states in this most recent era than ever 
before. Between 1816 and 1939 the average number of nation states in the 
system was 40.5; from 1945 to 1977, the average leaps to 110.4 
Even if the propensity of any individual nation to become involved in 
conflict has not changed, the explosion in the number of nation states implies 
that there are many more opportunities for conflict to arise; therefore, the 
absolute amount of conflict in the international system should rise, even if the 
involvement by any particular nation state does not. 
A Necessary Digression 
At this point, let me raise an issue that has implications beyond that of 
indicator construction. It is the matter of controlling for the number of nation 
states in the system when calculating the amount of military conflict. Because 
the size of the system increases so dramatically in the century-and-a-half 
under consideration, there is a strong argument to "normalize" conflict 
measures by dividing them by some function of the number of nation states 
(e.g., by the number of states or number of dyads). This enables us to 
measure per nation state unit involvement in conflict. However, if there is a 
chance that a conflict could escalate all the way to massive destruction (either 
on the scale of the World Wars, or beyond), then we would be just as 
interested in conflict per time unit, i.e., in conflict per year without controlling 
(and in most cases deflating) by nation state unit. It should be stressed that 
controlling for the number of nation states is not a question of right or wrong 
4These figures were calculated from Table 3 in Small and Singer, 1979. In regard to major powers 
(whose conflict experience is central to the analyses in this paper), however, the average number in 
the system each year drops from 6 in the time period 1816-1939 to 4.7 from 1946 to 1977. 
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but of the particular research interests at hand. In this paper, analyses will be 
presented both with and without normalizing for the size of the system. 
As this brief review has indicated, a number of reasons have been 
advanced as to why the amount of military conflict in the post-World War II 
era should differ from that in the 130 years preceding it. However, consensus 
on the direction of this change is lacking; all three possibilities (higher, lower, 
no change) have been mentioned. In the succeeding sections of this paper, I 
will operationalize military conflict and test whether there has been a change 
when examining all the major powers together, as well as their individual 
experiences. 
THE DATA BASE 
For purposes of this study, "military conflict" will be operationalized in 
terms of two different types of behavior: serious disputes (hereafter termed 
"disputes"), and wars. Both data sets were collected by the Correlates of 
War Project at the University of Michigan under the direction of J. David 
Singer and Melvin Small and cover the time period 1816-1976. 
The dispute data set has been collected only recently and is unfamiliar to 
many researchers. The following is a brief description of the data set. As of 
this writing, a summary handbook describing it in great detail is being pre- 
pared (Gochman, forthcoming).5 A dispute is a situation where military force 
is threatened or actually used between nation states. It thus represents a 
behavior somewhere on the continuum between peace and war, and, in the 
minds of governmental decision-makers, raises the possibility of war as an 
outcome. 
The presence of a dispute is inferred from the observation of one or more 
military force confrontations, hereafter termed "incidents." These are the 
individual threats and uses of force. In all, twelve types of incidents are coded 
in the data set. These incidents consist of three general types of military 
activity short of war: verbal threats of force (implying future action), displays 
of force (use of armed forces to demonstrate capacity, but not in military 
operations) and uses of force (use of armed forces in limited military opera- 
tions). Each serious dispute in the data set consists of one or more of these 
incidents. Incidents are grouped together if they are seen as being part of the 
same historical episode in the appropriate monograph or specialized diplo- 
matic or military history. However, if two incidents are separated in time by 
six months or more, they are automatically grouped into separate disputes. 
The process of aggregating incidents into disputes is far from a mechanical 
activity, requiring the use of judgment by both the coder and the source 
historian. But after five years of effort by the Project, they have high con- 
fidence in the grouping decisions that have been made. 
Disputes can have one of two outcomes: war or no war. War is defined as 
continuous reciprocated military combat between organized units of the 
5This summary covers only disputes involving at least one major power. Efforts are currently underway 
to extend the dataset to include minor power-minor power disputes. This is likely to result in a few 
changes to the major power interstate dispute collection but not a sufficient number to change the 
results of these analyses. 
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armed forces of both sides, and operationalized by the measure of 1000 or 
more total battle deaths suffered by the participant nation states.6 
Using these two basic variables, I constructed a number of indicators 
measuring the aggregate amount of conflict over time involving major 
powers. Analogous measures were also constructed for each individual major 
power's conflict involvement. The most basic indicators of conflict were 
simply the number of disputes per year and the number of wars per year. A 
third indicator used was the proportion of disputes escalating to war each 
year (note: if there were no disputes in a year, this variable was coded as 
missing). Separate indicators were also constructed to normalize the amounts 
of conflict for the growing number of nations in the system. 
At the aggregate (i.e., major power-interstate) level, I distinguish 
between three categories of participation in conflict: conflicts involving major 
powers on both sides, conflicts involving major powers on only one side, and 
the summation of the two. The normalization used was to divide the fre- 
quencies per year by the appropriate number of dyads of nations. For the 
three categories of participation noted above, the normalizations are the 
number of major power-major power dyads, the number of major 
power-minor power dyads, and the sum of the two. Thus, in measuring the 
total amount of conflict over time, I have three classifications of participants, 
and within each of these classifications five measures of conflict per year 
(disputes, disputes per dyad, wars, wars per dyad, and wars per dispute). 
Five similar conflict measures were also constructed for each individual 
major power's conflict involvement. Since the numbers of conflicts for each 
major power were smaller than for the aggregate, I did not construct separate 
indicators for each class of participant (i.e., French major power-minor 
power disputes per year). The normalization procedure for each individual 
major power was to divide disputes per year and wars per year by N - 1, 
where N equals the number of nations in the system. This figure represents 
the maximum number of conflict dyads a major power could participate in 
during that year. Finally, the conflict indicators were constructed only in 
those years that the nation state was a major power (i.e., individual 
indicators for the U.S. begin in 1899). Table 1 displays the nations that are 
considered major powers in the post-World II era and the dates of their 
membership in this elite club, as well as the year they acquired a nuclear 
weapons capability (see below). All other nation states in the system during a 
given year are considered to be minor powers. 
Examination of the Individual Major Powers 
The major powers constitute an oligarchy with many shared character- 
6See Singer and Small, 1972. Note that the requirement for continuous combat between organized 
armed forces would seem to remove both the Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia from Soviet war involvements. In neither case is there evidence of much military 
coordination on the Hungarian or Czechoslovakian side. The Hungarian Revolution is included in 
Singer and Small's list of interstate wars; a figure of 25,000 is given for Hungarian battle deaths. 
Therefore, it is included in the analyses. To ensure that the Czech case in 1968 did not affect he 
results for the Soviet Union, all Soviet analyses were run both with and without a war coded as the 
outcome of the Russian-Czech dispute. Although this did not change the results markedly, both 
sets are reported when small differences occurred. 
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TABLE 1. MAJOR POWERS IN THE STUDY 
Year Acquired 
Nation Years Major Power Nuclear Weapons Capability 
United States 1899 - 1976 1945 
United Kingdom 1816 - 1976 1952 
France 1816- 1940; 1945 - 1976 1960 
Soviet Union 1816 - 1917; 1922 - 1976 1949 
China 1950- 1976 1964 
istics; they score far higher than the "average" nation state on measures of 
capability, conflict, and activity (Cusack, 1978: chapter 2). But in the post- 
World War II era, we might expect some differences between them regard- 
ing conflict experiences. The post-World War II era witnessed the rise to 
superpower status of both the United States and the Soviet Union, along 
with the decline of Britain and France. China also achieved a broader recog- 
nition of its capabilities, but perhaps short of super-power status. 
In keeping with their roles as superpowers and rivals, I would expect the 
United States and the Soviet Union to experience a rise in conflict activity in 
the post-World War II era; the same change would be expected for China. 
On the other hand, I would expect Britain and France to show a decline in 
conflict involvement, since their roles in the international system are smaller 
in the current (post-1945) era. 
Most of the tests conducted in this paper divide the observations of con- 
flict into two groups (e.g., pre- and post-World War II, pre- and post- 
acquisition of nuclear weapons). The few explicit predictor variables will be 
discussed next in the section on hypotheses and methodology. 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Three different techniques of analysis were used in this paper. Each 
tested a different variant of the basic research question: has there been a shift 
in the amount of military conflict in the post-World War II era? Further, 
three combinations of prediction-outcome variable sets were examined: the 
effect of aggregate major power interstate characteristics on aggregate major 
power interstate military conflict, the effect of these same aggregate charac- 
teristics on the conflict experience of each individual major power, and, 
finally, the effect of each individual major power's characteristics on its own 
military conflict level. These variable sets will be referred to as the aggregate- 
aggregate, aggregate-individual, and individual-individual variable sets, 
respectively. 
Pre-test Post-test Differences. the T-test 
The first technique used is a simple t-test to ascertain whether the mean 
level of conflict changed after the introduction of an "experimental variable" 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963). The hypothesis is that the introduction of this 
"variable" will lead to a change in the amount of conflict. At the aggregate- 
This content downloaded from 128.42.230.100 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:11:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Major Power Interstate Conflict 593 
aggregate level, the experimental variable is occurrence of the post-World 
War II era. A total of 15 t-tests were run (there are five aggregate conflict 
measures for each of the three classes of conflict participants), with the pre- 
test period being 1916-45 and the post-test period being 1946-76.7 The mean 
values for each of the five measures were computed before and after the 1946 
breakpoint, and a t-test was used to determine if the post-World War II 
means were significantly different from the pre-World War II means. 
Shifting to the aggregate-individual level, the experimental variable 
remains the same. But this time, the test is made on the conflict experience of 
each nation that was a major power both before and after World War II (see 
Table 1). The hypothesis tested is that the amount of conflict experienced by 
a major power will change in the post-World War II era. This set of analysis 
yielded a total of twenty t-tests (five conflict measures for each of the four 
nation states that were major powers both before and after World War II); 
once again, the t-test, is used to determine if the post-World War II mean 
differs from the pre-World War II mean on each indicator. 
Finally, for the individual-individual analyses, the experimental variable 
was the acquisition of a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability by a major 
power. The hypothesis is that the amount of military conflict experienced by 
a major power will change after it acquires nuclear weapons. Note that, for 
the United States, this hypothesis has already been tested (due to the fact that 
World War II ended and the U.S. demonstrated its nuclear capability in the 
same year). But we can now test to see if China experienced a change in its 
conflict behavior after it acquired nuclear weapons. 
Time-Based Trends in Conflict. Correlation 
While the t-test is the most straightforward way to test changes in the amount 
of conflict in the post-experimental variable intervention period (either 
World War II or the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by a major 
power), it has at least one major vulnerability. Suppose the amount of con- 
flict varies systematically over time (up or down, it does not matter). By 
splitting the observation into two time-based groups, we may conclude that 
the post-World War II era represents a break with the past, when it is only 
the final observation period of a continuous change. That is, it is not a break 
with the past but merely the tail end of an upward or downward trend. To 
guard against this possibility, the conflict measures were correlated with 
time. Two other variables that co-vary with time were mentioned in the dis- 
cussion of why we should expect a change in conflict: the number of nations 
in the system and the number of nation states with a demonstrated nuclear 
capability. Since they offer more specific (although complementary) 
hypotheses than time per se, they were also correlated with the conflict 
measures. 
7The use of 1946 as the breakpoint means, strictly speaking, that there is a single year between the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States and the year following the end of World 
War II. I do not report the U.S. analyses at the individual-individual level with this one year 
included in the post- period, since it contained no disputes or wars and made no difference in any 
results. 
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With the aggregate-aggregate variable set, year was correlated with all 
measures of conflict. For each of the three types of conflict participant 
(major-major, major-minor, and the combination of the two), the appropri- 
ate number of dyads per year was also correlated with the conflict measures. 
Finally, the total number of major powers with demonstrated nuclear capa- 
bility was also correlated with the conflict measures. 
For the aggregate-individual variable set, much the same procedure was 
followed. Year was correlated with each individual major power's conflict 
measures, as was the total number of nuclear major powers. In place of the 
number of dyads, the number of nation states in the system was used to 
establish whether a major power's conflict experience was related to changes 
in the size of the global system. There were no unique individual-individual 
correlations; all the possibilities were covered in the aggregate-individual 
correlations.8 
Forecasting the Amount of Conflict. Probability Modeling 
The third technique of analysis involved the "forecasting" of conflict 
levels in the post-experimental variable era (either post-World War II or 
post-nuclear weapons acquisition) from the prior level of conflict o the pre- 
experimental era. In most cases, it was also possible to measure statistically 
the fit of the forecasts to the observed amounts of conflict. Two different 
probability models were used for these forecasts. Disputes per year and wars 
per year were forecast using the model for the Poisson distribution, and the 
number of escalations from dispute to war was forecast using the model for 
the binomial distribution. 
Given A, the average number of events occurring in a time period, the 
Poisson model was used to generate the probability of observing k events per 
unit time, k ranging from 0 to n, with n producing a cumulative probability 
of .999 or greater. More specifically, in the case of forecasting disputes per 
year in the post-World War II era, the estimate of A was the pre-World 
War II average number of disputes per year. Given this figure, the proba- 
bility of observing a year with 0 disputes, with 1 dispute, with 2 disputes, 
etc., was calculated, until the sum of these probabilities reached or exceeded 
.999. Multiplying each probability by the number of years in the post-World 
War II period produced the number of years in that period we expect to 
observe 0 disputes, the number of years we expect to observe 1 dispute, etc. 
This expected distribution, derived from the pre-World War II conflict level, 
was then compared with the corresponding observed distribution, and a Chi- 
8A number of more sophisticated analyses could be suggested. The reader should rest assured that the 
more obvious ones were run and did not produce results different from those to be reported here. 
In particular, rank order correlations were run to check of conflict was related monotonically (but 
not linearly) to the predictor variables in the study, multiple regression was used to simultaneously 
determine the effects of the experimental intervention variables (the post-World War II and/or 
post-nuclear weapons acquisition variables), and the continuous control variables (time and the 
other time-related variables). Finally, Box-Jenkins time series analysis (ARIMA) was applied to 
determine if the use of correlation and regression obscured a more complicated time relationship 
in the conflict measures. 
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square test was run to determine the probability of the observed distribution 
occurring, given the expected distribution.9 
Given the probability, p, that a dispute will end in war, and given d 
disputes, the model for the binomial distribution was used to calculate the 
probability of observing w wars ( i.e., the number of escalations from dispute 
to war). The estimate for the probability, p, was taken from the pre- 
experimental period, and the value for d was the actual number of disputes 
observed in the post-experimental period. Unfortunately, although the 
probabilities of observing from 0 to d wars could be generated, there is only a 
single observed point-the actual number of escalations from dispute to war. 
Therefore, there is no actual "distribution" to be compared with the 
expected, and there is no way to compute a measure of fit corresponding to 
the Chi-square for the Poisson model test outlined above.10 
For the aggregate-aggregate variable set, the Poisson model was used to 
calculate the expected distribution of disputes per year and wars per year in 
the post-World War II era, given the pre-World War II average. This was 
done separately for all three classes of dispute and war participation. The 
binomial was used to calculate the chances of observing the actual number of 
escalations to war from dispute in the post-World War II era, given the pre- 
World War II chances. These calculations were also done separately for each 
class of participant. For the aggregate-individual variable set, the two proba- 
bility models were used to forecast the distribution of post-World War II 
disputes, wars, and the number of escalations to war, for each individual 
major power, given its own pre-World War II experiences. Finally, for the 
individual-individual variable set, the predictions were done for each 
individual major power, but the pre- post- breakpoint is the year of that 
major power's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. 
These three types of analysis certainly do not exhaust the available tech- 
niques for detecting change, nor do the indicators used represent the entire 
range of measurement of levels of conflict possible from the raw data. Taken 
together, however, they represent a reasonable first step in evaluating 
whether the amount of conflict involving major powers had changed in the 
recent era. The discussion of results begins with the aggregate-aggregate 
variable set and proceeds through the aggregate-individual set to the 
individual-individual variable set. 
9Using the model for the Poisson distribution, the probability of observing k disputes in a year, p(k), 
given, A, the average number of disputes occurring in the pre-World War II era is: 
e -AAk p(k) = 
(Derman, Gleser, and Olkin, 1973: 265-74) 
'Using the model for the binomial distribution, the probability of observing w wars, p(w), in d disputes, 
given a probability, p, of escalation from dispute to war is: 
p(w)- d ! pW(l d - w 
(Derman, Gleser, and , 1973: 247-56) 
(Derman, Gleser, and Olkin, 1973' 247-56) 
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AGGREGATE-AGGREGATE RESULTS 
Table 2 displays the results of the t-tests and the correlations for the 
aggregate-aggregate analysis. Examining the t-tests first, we see that the 
number of major power interstate disputes rose sharply in the post-World 
War II era; the average number of disputes per year rises from 1.28 to 
1.84.11 But when the number of major power interstate dyads was controlled 
for, the pre- post- difference was quite small. The other clear change was the 
sharp rise in the number of major power-major power disputes in the post- 
TABLE 2. AGGREGATE-AGGREGATE MAJOR POWER ANALYSIS, 1816 - 1976 
T-values: Amounts of Aggregate Conflict Per Year, Breakpoint: 1946 
7ype of Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Involvement Disputes Dyad Wars Dyad Disputes 
Major Power Interstate 1.91* - .96 -.73 - 1.28** -.74 (109) 
Major-Major 1.25 3.53* -1.29** -1.26** -1.58** (51) 
Major-Minor 1.63 -1.76** -.10 -1.01 -.05 (89) 
NOTE: N = 161, except for Wars/Disputes (shown in parentheses). 
Correlations: Amounts of Aggregate Conflict Per Year With Time and Time Related Measures 
Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Disputes Dyad Wars Dyad Disputes 
Ma/or Power Interstate 
Year .24* -.22* -.07 -.21 -.19* 
Number of Nations .32* -.17* .00 -.15 -.18 
Number of Nuclear 
Weapons States .20* - .08 - .06 -.10 - .07 
Major-Maqor 
Year .17* .18* - .03 -.19* -.19 
Number of Nations .15* - .12* .13 - .08 .07 
Number of Nuclear 
Weapons States .08 .20* -.09 -.08 -.20 
Major-Minor 
Year .20* -.19* -.08 -.19 -.14 
Number of Nations .28* -.14 - .03 -.15 - .12 
Number of Nuclear 
Weapons States .13* -. 11 -.01 - .08 - .05 
* Significant at the .05 level 
**Significant at the .05 level if degrees of freedom are modified for unequal pre- and post- variances 
"Tables containing descriptive statistics and the probability model results are available from the author: 
reference will be made to figures from these tables when appropriate. 
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World War II era when the number of major-major dyads was controlled for 
(from .024 per year to .063 per year). 
For some of the other variables indicated in the table, if a correction for 
unequal variances in the pre- and post- eras was made, the t-tests indicate a 
significant shift in levels of conflict. However, since the post- group has 31 
observations, it is not clear that such an adjustment was really necessary. 
Note that all of the effected t-tests (predominantly for major-major participa- 
tion) indicate a downward shift in conflict levels in the post-World War II era. 
Concentrating on the signs of the t-tests, a general trend emerges: the 
number of disputes per year rises is all categories, but the number of wars 
shows no corresponding rise; in fact, some decline is discernible. 
The correlations are, without exception, modest. The largest is .32, 
accounting for only about 10 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable. I hesitate to dwell on them, but a few summary comments are in 
order. First (and most obvious), there is no evidence of a strong linear trend 
over time. Second, the highest associations are usually with year and the 
lowest with the number of majors possessing nuclear weapons. Third, with 
the exception of disputes per year, the associations with time and the other 
time-related variables are negative. Overall, then, there is a very modest 
downward linear trend over the time period, and this is most closely 
associated with time itself, and not the two time-related variables of number 
of dyads, and number of majors possessing nuclear weapons. 
Table 3 displays a summary of the results of probability model forecasts. 
Turning first o the major power-interstate results, the number of disputes in 
the post-World War II era is significantly different from the pre-World War 
II level; many more occur than would be expected. A difference also occurs 
in the number of wars (less occur after World War II than would be 
expected), but it is not statistically significant. With regard to escalation from 
dispute to war, fewer than expected escalations occur (four are observed; 
nine were expected from the pre-World War II frequency). Not surprisingly, 
the chances of observing only four escalations out of the fifty-nine post-World 
War II major power-interstate disputes was quite slight (.03), given the .14 
probability of escalation in the earlier era. 
TABLE 3. PROBABILITY MOIEL RESULTS: SYSTEM LEVEL PRE- POST-WORLD WAR II BREAKPOINT 
Measure of Conflict 
Nation State Disputes Per Year Wars Per Year Wars Per Dispute 
Involvement x2 df Prob. x2 df Prob. Pr (Observed Wars) 
Major Power 
Interstate 21.57 5 < .001 (H) .79 2 .60 (L) .03 
Major Power- 
Major Power 4.99 3 .15 (H) 2.00 1 .15(L) .04 
Major Power- 
Minor Power 22.21 4 <.001 (H) .31 1 .60(H) .13 
NOTE: H or L after Chi-Square Probability indicates whether post-breakpoint amount of conflict is 
higher or lower than pre-breakpoint amount. 
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When major-major conflict experience is separated out, the results are 
much the same. However, the distribution of disputes that actually occurred 
fit the expected better than was the case for all major power-interstate 
disputes, and the number of wars does not fit as well. The chances of 
observing the actual number of escalations to war (o) is, of course, quite 
small. 
The major-minor results display some differences from the previous 
findings. The observed distribution of disputes is higher than the expected, 
but the observed number of wars is close to the expected number. Not sur- 
prisingly, the number of actual escalations was closer to the expected number 
than for the major power interstate or major-major disputes. 
Summarizing the aggregate-aggregate findings, the absolute number of 
disputes is higher in the post-World War II era; but as might be expected, a 
considerable deflation occurs when the number of possible nation-dyads is 
controlled for. The exception to this decline is major-major disputes, which 
show a rise when the number of major power dyads is controlled for; as noted 
before, there are fewer major powers in the post-World War II era than in 
the previous 130 years. 
On the brighter side, although the number of disputes has risen, the 
number of wars has not, even without controlling for the larger system size. 
In fact, there is some evidence of a modest decline in the number of wars and 
in the escalation from dispute to war. 
AGGREGATE-INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES 
In this second set of analyses, the predictor variables remain the same, 
but the outcome variables now represent the conflict experiences of each 
individual major power. This is done to guard against the ecological fallacy; 
there is no guarantee that any change in aggregate major power-interstate 
behavior is mirrored in the experiences of each and every individual major 
power, as well as for intrinsic interest in the different experiences of the 
individual major powers (see above). 
Table 4 displays the results of the t-tests and correlations for each major 
power's conflict experience. China is excluded from these analyses since it 
was not a major power both before and after World War II (thus providing 
no "pre" group). Recall also that, because of the small number of events 
(disputes and wars) for each major power, the conflict experiences were not 
broken down into the three classes of participation that were used in the 
aggregate-aggregate analyses. 
The findings are not earthshaking, but, once again, some overall patterns 
emerge. Signs of increased involvement in disputes per year are present for 
both the United States (dramatically) and the Soviet Union (less so). This 
increased involvement in disputes (contrasted with no change or a drop-off 
for Britain and France) was not unexpected. As noted above, the two super- 
powers were (and are) the leaders of blocs of rival countries and engaged in 
many global confrontations during this period. When the conflict measure is 
disputes per nation, however, the increases in superpower involvement dis- 
appear; in fact, the Soviet Union shows a drop, although it is not statistically 
significant. Drops for Britain and France are even more pronounced. With 
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TABLE 4. AGG(REGATE-INDIVIDUAL MAJOR POWER ANALYSIS, 1816 - 1976 
T-Values: Amounts of Individual Conflict Per Year, Breakpoint: 1946 
Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Nation (N) Disputes Nations Wars Nations Disputes 
United States (78) 2.57* .06 .35 .31 .66 (30) 
United Kingdom (161) .16 -2.13* .36 .40 .28(77) 
France (155) -1.26 -2.74* .30 -.99 -.17(55) 
USSR (157) 1.62 -1.23 -1.29 -1.26 - 1.97 (54) 
NOTE: Total N given in second column. N for Wars/Disputes in parentheses after last column 
CORRELATIONS: Amounts of Individual Conflict With Time and Time Related Measures 
Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Disputes Nations Wars Nations Disputes 
Year 
United States .20 -.14 .01 - .07 - .11 
United Kingdom .00 - .20* .02 - .06 .01 
France -.05 -.22 -.05 -.14 -.12 
USSR .16 -.09 -.03 -.09 -.18 
Number of Nations 
United States .29 - .06 - .01 - .08 -.19 
United Kingdom -.02 - .21* -.01 -.05 -.03 
France -.09 -.24 -.07 -.12 -.11 
USSR .15 -.13 -.03 -.06 -.23 
Number of Nuclear Weapons 
States 
United States .34* .02 .03 - .05 -.18 
United Kingdom - .02 -.18* -.01 - .05 -.04 
France -.11 -.21* -.06 -.09 -.05 
USSR .12 -.11 -.10 -.09 -.24 
*Significant at the .05 level 
regard to the war and escalation measures, no nation shows an increase; the 
Soviet Union's war and escalation measures are close to being statistically 
significant in a downward direction. 
For Britain and France there is a drop in dispute involvement when the 
number of nation states in the system is controlled for, but little change in 
their conflict involvement is evident elsewhere in the table. That their 
involvement in disputes has, by one measure, dropped off is not surprising, 
considering that their roles in the international system (and their capabilities 
to intervene globally) have changed. Perhaps more interesting is that a drop 
in conflict involvement is not more prevalent. 
A few words should be said specifically about the correlations. Once 
again, the values are small. The largest, .34, only accounts for 12 percent of 
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the variance in the dependent variable. If one is willing to accept correlations 
of .20 or greater as indicative of a modest relationship, we can draw a few 
inferences. For both Britain and France, dispute per nation involvement has 
shown a slight decline over time. It appears that the post-World War II drop 
on this measure indicated by the t-tests is, in part, the culmination of a long- 
term downward trend. 
For the United States, there is also evidence of a modest trend over time 
in dispute involvement-in an upward direction. The strongest of the 
correlations is with number of major powers with nuclear weapons, and the 
next strongest correlation is with the number of nations. Both these measures 
rise quite steeply after World War II. This indicates that the rise in U.S. 
involvement is greatest in the post-World War II era, and this finding 
corresponds to both our expectations and the results of the t-tests. 
The summary of the probability models for the aggregate-individual 
analysis is displayed in Table 5. For dispute involvement there are no 
surprises; the United States and the Soviet Union have more involvements 
than their pre-World War II levels would lead us to expect (although the 
Chi-square for the Soviet Union falls just short of the .05 significance level), 
while Britain and France show little deviation from their expected levels. 
With regard to number of wars, no major power's involvement is signifi- 
cantly different from its pre-World War II involvement. 
TABLE 5. PROBABILITY MODEl. RESULTS: 
INDIVIDUAL MAJOR POWERS PRE- POST-WORLD WAR II BREAKPOINT 
Measure of Conflict 
Disputes Per Year Wars Per Year Wars Per Dispute 
Major Powers X2 df Prob. x2 df Prob. Pr (Observed Wars) 
United States 96.60 3 <.001(H) .41 1 .60 (H) .13 
United Kingdom 1.35 4 .85 (H) .31 1 .85 (H) .28 
France 2.19 4 .75(L) .13 2 .93 (L) .29 
Soviet Union 7.04 3 .07 (H) 1.35 2 .60 (L) .05 
.36 2 .80 (L) .13 
NOTE: H or L after Chi-Square probability indicates whether post-breakpoint amount of conflict is 
higher or lower than pre-breakpoint amount. Second set of figures for the Soviet Union includes 
a war coded as the outcome of the 1968 Czech dispute. 
It is in the prediction of escalation from dispute to war that the most 
interesting findings emerge. As might be anticipated, the probability of 
observing the number of escalations by the United States and the Soviet 
Union is quite low; both would be most likely to have been involved in four 
wars and were actually involved in two and one (or two, with Czechoslo- 
vakia), respectively. The surprise comes when we examine the predictions 
for Britain and France. Given the number if dispute involvements for each, 
the most likely number of war involvements is one. Both are actually 
involved in two interstate wars (Korea in 1950 and the Sinai War in 1956). 
This content downloaded from 128.42.230.100 on Thu, 2 May 2013 15:11:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Major Power Interstate Conflict 601 
The separate analyses of each major power's post-World War II conflict 
involvement have produced some interesting findings. Dispute involvement 
for the two superpowers is up in this era, although this increase disappears 
when the number of nations in the system is taken into account. Dispute 
involvement for Britain and France has not risen in this era, and when the 
number of nations in the system is taken into account, it has fallen. War 
involvement for all majors has not risen. The combination of these two 
effects means that the chances of escalation for the United States and the 
Soviet Union are lower in the current era than in the past, while the corres- 
pondering changes of escalation are a bit higher for Britain and France. This 
later finding is due to the fact that, while the number of British and French 
war involvements has not risen, their dispute involvement has fallen. While 
it is discouraging that the dispute involvement of the two superpowers has 
not fallen, at least we can take solace from the fact that their escalation pro- 
pensities have decreased. On the other hand, for the non-superpower major 
powers, although dispute involvement is down, there is no decrease in the 
chance of escalation to war. 
INDIVIDUAL-INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES 
The final set of analyses shifts the breakpoint for each major power's 
conflict experience to the date that each demonstrated a capacity to build 
nuclear weapons. Note that, because of the coincidence of the end of World 
War II and the dropping of the first atomic bombs, the individual-individual 
analysis for the United States is identical to the aggregate-individual 
analyses just reported, and it will not be repeated. The correlations with time 
and time-related variables that were shown in Table 4 are also identical to 
the individual-individual correlations for the four major powers discussed 
above, so these too will not be repeated. An additional nation is added to the 
analyses: China, which becomes a major power in 1950. The correlations for 
China are reported in Table 6. 
For the major powers that were also included in the aggregate-individual 
analyses, there are few changes when the breakpoint is shifted. As before, 
only a small number of the t-tests are statistically significant; both Britain 
and France show drops in disputes per nation in the post-break period (as in 
the previous analyses), and the pattern for the Soviet Union is identical to 
that obtained in the aggregate-individual analyses. About the only change 
occurs in French dispute involvements. In the earlier analyses, their involve- 
ment declined in the post-World War II period, while it increases when the 
date of their acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is used. Note, how- 
ever, that neither t-test is statistically significant. More will be said about this 
later. 
China experiences no change in dispute involvement after the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, and all of the other conflict indicators show small to 
moderate drops over time. However, China is only a major power for a small 
number of years, and dividing its conflict experiences into two groups leaves 
few cases in both groups. The drop over time in Chinese escalation to war (as 
evidenced by the t-tests and especially the correlations) is particularly 
interesting-but note that this variable only has eleven time points. 
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TABLE 6. INDIVIDUAL-INDIVIDUAL MAJOR POWER ANALYSIS, 1816 - 1976 
T-VALUE: Amounts of Individual Conflict Per Year, Breakpoint: Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons 
Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Nation (N) Disputes Nations Wars Nations Disputes 
United States Results identical to those in Table 4 
United Kingdom (25)** .12 -2.00* -.24 -.67 .02 (67) 
France (17) 1.07 -2.13* -1.27' - 1.19 -.98'(55) 
USSR (28) 1.20 -1.49' -1.20' -1.18' - 1.73'(54) 
China (13) .14 -.59 -1.41 -1.38 -1.32 (11) 
NOTE: Total N given in second column. N for Wars/Disputes in parentheses after last column. 
CORRELATIONS: Amounts of Individual Conflict With Time and Time Related Measures 
Disputes/ Wars/ Wars/ 
Nation Disputes Nations Wars Nations Disputes 
China 
Year .05 -.11 -.25 -.29 -.48 
Number of Nations .03 -.14 -.18 -.23 - .36 
Number of Nuclear Weapons 
States .02 -.15 -.28 -.33 -.51 
'Significant at the .05 level if degrees of freedom are modified for unequal pre- and post- variances 
*Significant at the .05 level 
* *Number of post-nuclear weapons years; total N for each nation are the same as in Table 4, except for 
China, which is 27. 
Turning to the summary of the probability models (Table 7), all major 
powers show no significant differences from anticipated behavior in dispute 
predictions. But the fit is generally better for Britain and France than for 
China and the Soviet Union. 
The wars per year for each major power hold few surprises. With the 
exception of Britain, each major power experiences slightly less war than pre- 
dicted. Britain's war involvement is as expected, given their previous experi- 
ence. Regarding the number of escalations to war, given the number of 
dispute involvement, as with the aggregate-individual analyses, Britain and 
France display little change from their pre-nuclear periods. Both the Soviet 
Union and China experienced less escalation than expected from their pre- 
nuclear experience. 
The patterns in the individual-individual analyses are similar to those in 
the aggregate-individual analyses. Few dramatic shifts in behavior are 
evident in the "post" eras. Britain and France's dispute per nation involve- 
ment is less in their post-nuclear period, but their number of escalations to 
war is close to that of the pre-nuclear era. Soviet dispute involvement is up 
when disputes per year is used and down when the system size is taken into 
account. China shows little change on either dispute measure. Using any of 
the measures of war involvement, both of these superpowers are involved in 
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TABLE 7. PROBABILITY MOI)EL RESULTS: 
INDIVIDUAI MAJOR POWERS PRE-POST NU(CLEAR WEAPONS BREAKPOINT 
Measure of Conflict 
Disputes Per Year Wars Per Year Wars Per Dispute 
Major Power x2 df Prob. X2 df Prob. Pr (Observed Wars) 
United Kingdom 
1952- 1976 .82 4 .93 (H) .02 1 .85(L) .37 
France 
1960-1976 1.87 3 .75(L) 1.56 2 .40(L) .38 
Soviet Union 
1949 -1976 4.32 3 .25 (H) 1.02 2 .60 (L) .12 
.19 2 .93 (L) .20 
China 
1964-1976 4.18 4 .40(L) 2.00 2 .40(L) .10 
NOTE: H or L after Chi-Square probability indicates whether post-breakpoint amount of conflict is 
higher or lower than pre-breakpoint amount. Second set of figures for the Soviet Union includes 
a war coded as the outcome of the 1968 Czech disputes. Years below each nation indicate the 
post-nuclear weapons period. 
fewer wars. In sum, there is little evidence of a dramatic and constant effect 
on conflict behavior from the possession of nuclear weapons. Any changes 
that did occur in conflict involvement appear to have been underway by the 
end of World War II. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper began by enumerating a number of reasons why the post- 
World War II era might be expected to have marked a change in the level of 
interstate conflict. Despite general agreement on the major changes in this 
era, there is much less consensus about the effect of each of these changes on 
the level of conflict. It is this conceptual disarray that accounts for the induc- 
tive character of this research; there was just too little agreement in the litera- 
ture to allow for a more deductive investigation. As such, the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the results are less focused than one might wish. 
At the system level the number of disputes per year has increased over 
time, but when the number of nations in the system is used to deflate the 
frequency, there is no rise except for major power-major power disputes. 
Thus, major power involvement in disputes has increased only at the rate 
expected, given the rise in independent nation states. Since the creation of 
new nation states in the international system has about ceased, the absolute 
number of disputes per year can be expected to level off in the near future. 
This one exception to this is the rise in direct (major power-major power) 
disputes. This rise is undoubtedly due to the antagonism of the Cold War. 
The United States (to a great extent) and the Soviet Union (to a lesser 
extent) show increases in disputes, while the United Kingdom and France do 
not. Thus, the individual major power analyses shed additional light on the 
findings of the system level. The particularly dramatic increase in dispute 
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involvement by the United States is indicative of its rise to superpower status 
from non-involvement in global affairs. The less dramatic Soviet increase 
perhaps reflects its shorter step from active major power to superpower rival. 
The finding concerning Britain and France's dispute involvement are, 
for the most part, consistent with their decrease in status in the post-World 
War II era. When the measure of conflict is dispute per nation per year, both 
experience a drop in involvement. However, when disputes per year is used, 
one disquieting discovery was made. Using the 1946 breakpoint, the United 
Kingdom shows no change in dispute involvement, and this finding is 
repeated when the nuclear weapons breakpoint is substituted. France, how- 
ever, is a different matter. Disputes per year shows a drop when 1946 is used 
but a rise when the nuclear weapons breakpoint is used. As mentioned 
earlier, neither of these values is statistically significant, but the shift in sign is 
worth pondering. France is the only nation in the study that (a) was a major 
power before and after World War II and (b) developed nuclear weapons a 
number of years after the war. The joint impact of the two findings is to 
argue that the immediate impact of the World War II experience on France 
was to decrease its involvement in interstate disputes. But the development of 
nuclear weapons co-varied with an increase in French disputes per year. The 
results are not strong, and any causality is far from established, but there is a 
hint of a nuclear weapons effect. Note that, when the number of nation states 
is used as a denominator, France shows a significant drop in disputes per 
year. 
War involvement by the major powers, collectively and individually, 
shows no increase. When the number of nations in the system is controlled 
for, there is even evidence of a decrease (as there is for major-minor war). 
The combined effect of both the previous sets of findings is that the changes 
of escalation from dispute to war are no greater, and may well be less, in the 
post-World War II era. This time period provides ample opportunity for 
major power conflict but has seen a reluctance of these governments to take 
the final step to war. We should not rest easily, though, since the potential 
cost of any war involving a major power is far greater now than ever before. 
Looking forward, the immediate threat of a renewed active rivalry between 
the United States and the Soviet Union is an increase in disputes but not 
necessarily an increase in chances of war. 
The effect of controlling for number of nations on dispute and war noted 
in this paper has implications for the system structure debate mentioned at 
the beginning of the paper. The focus on system structure and conflict has per- 
haps underplayed (although not ignored) the effect of system size. More 
attention should be devoted to the separate and interactive effects of both 
variables on conflict. 
A final word about proliferation is necessary. Three of the nations in this 
study proliferated shortly after World War II. This action appears to have no 
unique effect on their conflict involvement beyond a general post-World 
War II effect. However, there may not be enough of a gap between these 
breakpoints to discriminate between the two. The French case is the only 
nation that might allow this, and the results are disturbing, albeit not 
dramatic. 
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A further question can be raised about the applicability of these results to 
minor powers. This is particularly crucial with regard to proliferation. Are 
the hints from the French results a harbinger of the future? Only time will 
tell, but the problem merits close attention, particularly since the findings of 
this paper are ambiguous on this point. 
Returning to the major powers, it would seem, then, that high levels of 
power in the post-World War II era go hand-in-hand with high levels of 
dispute involvement but not high levels of war involvement. For this we can 
be grateful. Despite this, however, and despite the lack of a demonstrated 
nuclear weapons effect for the superpowers, we must remember that the costs 
of a possible major power war have climbed to unprecedented levels with the 
introduction of these weapons. If we are to have a good chance of surviving 
to the year 2000, we must be wary that any use of military force by a major 
power could lead to a disaster for all of mankind. 
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